The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for management of an exploited marine fish stock, one whose range straddles both "Extended Economic Zones" (EEZs) and high seas waters. However, the Agreement provides to the Regional Organization no coercive enforcement powers. In this connections two problems in particular have been cited: The first, called the "interloper problem", concerns the difficulty of controlling the harvesting by non-member vessels. The second problem, called the "new-member problem", concerns the inherent difficulties of negotiating mutually acceptable terms of entry.
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for the management of exploited high seas "straddling" fish stocksthose whose range is partly in international waters, but typically overlaps certain coastal states' Extended Economic Zones. The Agreement specifies that harvesting, wherever within the biological range it occurs, should be coordinated by a coalition of the traditional harvesting states, acting through a U.N. sanctioned Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO). While simultaneously recognizing the right of all states to utilize the biological resources of the high seas, the agreement calls for those nations who wish to participate in harvest of the straddling stock, but are not currently members of the RFMO, to declare a willingness to join and to enter into negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry.
However, the agreement provides to the RFMO no coercive enforcement powers, either to exclude non-member harvest nor to set the terms of entry into membership.
This lack of enforcement power has caused many to doubt the effectiveness of the proposed regional management mechanism. Two inter-related problems in particular have been cited:
The first, called by Gordon Munro (1999) the "interloper problem", concerns the difficulty of controlling the harvesting by non-member vessels. These include individu- 1 
BASIC SUPPORT FOR ROBERT MCKELVEY'S RESEARCH ON HIGH SEAS MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN THROUGH GRANT DBI-9708475 FROM THE US NA-TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION. LEIF SANDAL AND STEIN STEINSHAMN ARE GREAT-FUL FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE NORWEGIAN RESEARCH COUNCIL. THE MODELING ANALYSIS IN THIS STUDY WAS INITIATED DURING A VISIT BY DR. MCK-ELVEY TO THE NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRA-TION DURING SPRING 1999, WITH HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES THERE BEING FUNDED BY
THE NORWEGIAN RESEARCH COUNCIL.
ally operated vessels (perhaps flying flags-of-convenience) but also include coordinated multi-vessel "distant water fleets" (DWFs) seeking targets-of-opportunity, intent on skimming off a bountiful harvest wherever it occurs, but with little interest in the long-term conservation of the stocks.
The second problem identified by Kaitala and Munro (1993) , as the "new member problem", concerns the inherent difficulties of negotiating, in a timely manner, mutually acceptable terms of entry, which will specify the petitioning nation's membership rights and obligations.
These two separate problems merge when a DWF, previously not heavily engaged in a particular straddling stock fishery, appears on the scene and declares an interest in joining an already well-established RFMO. In this situation the interests of the current members and the applicant are strongly opposed, with current members facing the likelihood of having to give up a portion of their present quotas to the prospective new member, and the applicant believing that it might be advantageous to remain outside of the coalition, continuing to harvest profitably while demonstrating its strategic strengths for future negotiations. This is the second of two studies, in which we address these inter-related problems.
In the first (McKelvey, et. al., 2002) we examine strategic aspects of a confrontation between a RFMO and a DWF, in a situation where the entire stock is susceptible to DWF high seas harvest. In this case a RFMO, lacking statutory enforcement powers, has little ability through harvest policy alone to mount an effective defense against DWF pulse fishing, and its consequent economic disruption and stock degradation.
Here we examine a straddling stock fishery, when the fish stock range includes a high seas component, but a substantial portion of the stock remains within the exclusive EEZs of the RFMO members, where it is protected against harvest by any DWF fleet. This is a common situation for many major fish stocks worldwide (Meltzer, 1994) . The typical behavior of the RFMO states is to confine their harvest to home waters, essentially abandoning the high seas portion of the stock range to the DWFs.
In this case, the home fleets can respond to the presence of the high seas DWF by harvesting more intensively on home ground, lowering seasonal escapement and hence the subsequent fishing season's recruitment, and so lowering the likelihood of future entry of the DWF.
But a still more active RFMO strategy might also be contemplated. In an effort to deter the current-season entry of any potential distant-water invader, the regional fleet might move preemptively into international waters, to fish-down the migratory portion of stock. The effect of this high seas overharvest could then be mitigated by a compensating reduction in the scale of the subsequent harvest in the EEZs.
The possibility of success of such aggressive RFMO strategies rests on the assumed likelihood that a DWF will face higher fixed costs of high seas entry than will the regional fleet. Not only are there the transportation costs of moving a DWF fleet to a distant fishing ground and maintaining it there, but there are also opportunity costs of doing so: A DWF fleet, displaced from its more traditional harvest grounds and seeking out targets-of-opportunity on the high seas, will have several options to choose from, and will enter this particular fishery only if the reward for doing so exceeds the potential return from harvesting elsewhere. Aggressive high seas harvesting by the RFMO may tip the balance decisively against DWF entry.
In this study we undertake to determine the optimal harvest policy for the RFMO β-fleet, given that it is undertaking total α-fleet (DWF) exclusion. Such a policy may often be expensive to implement but might be justified as avoiding potentially far more costly damage to the stocks from the distant-water harvesting and also as a means of establishing a reputation for aggressiveness in any future confrontations.
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It is most likely to prove effective when the distant-water fleet faces high entry costs and/or the migratory fraction of the fish-stock is small.
The existing game-theoretic analysis of industrial organization, (e.g. Tirole, 1988 ), provides some helpful insights into economic entry barriers, but its applicability here is complicated by the open-access character of resource exploitation in a high seas fishery. This derives from the fact that all harvesters are exploiting a common biological stock pool. As we shall see, this common-property externality reduces the effectiveness of any potential economic barrier which operates exclusively within the fishery sector.
THE BASIC FISHERY MODEL
We shall consider the case of a single harvested fish stock with non-overlapping generations, a stock which spawns in nursery grounds that lie entirely within the EEZs of the RFMO countries. Following dispersal, the young eventually mature to a harvestable stock biomass R, called the "recruitment to the fishery". This recruitment divides into two parts. One fraction R θ = θR will migrate beyond the territorial waters, into adjacent areas of the high seas, where it potentially is subject to harvest by both a distant-water α-fleet and the RFMO β-fleet. The remaining fraction R φ = φR , (1 − θ)R remains within the territorial EEZs. We assume that high seas harvest occurs first, ahead of harvest within the EEZs, and that thereby the high seas stock is reduced to a high seas "escapement" S θ . . This residual high seas stock then returns to the EEZs where it merges with the unharvested resident substock R φ to form a final seasonal harvestable stock
accessible only to the regional fleet. A home-waters harvest, by the regional fleet, now reduces R β to the end-of-season escapement biomass S β , which returns to the nursery ground to spawn and die.
The offspring generation from the spawn then matures to form, at the beginning of a new harvest season, a new recruitment level R + . The cycle then repeats. The offspring recruitment R + is determined from its parental biomass S β by the (deterministic) stock-recruitment equation.
Here F (S β ) is monotone increasing and concave, with
and a single positive fixed point K (the "carrying capacity"), where
Schematically,
2.1 Centrally-Managed Harvesting: A Baseline Model.
As a baseline to consideration of this competitive harvest, first assume RFMO central management of the fishery, where there is no threat of entry by an outside DWF. Thus all harvesting, h βφ in EEZs and h θ = h βθ on the high seas, is conducted exclusively by the RFMO fleet.
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The β-fleet's annual payoff from its harvests, on high-seas and in home waters, will
Here, π θ and π β may be any monotone increasing functions. A frequent choice is
The home fleet's objective is to choose its harvest policy to maximize the discounted sum of future annual returns.
with given discount factor γ < 1. We shall make the simplifying assumption (quite often bourn out) that home-ground harvest costs are lower than those on the high seas (for example, c β < c θ ). This implies that when there is no threat of invasion the home fleet will harvest exclusively in home waters. In fact, for any assumed total annual harvest, seasonal value Π β (t) will be greatest when all harvest is postponed until the high seas stock has returned to the EEZs.
The cyclic generational pattern now simplifies to:
It follows from standard harvesting theory [e.g. Clark, 1990 ] that a centrally managed fleet, when harvesting monopolistically on home ground and maximizing the objective function
will set a harvest policy of fishing-down to a fixed target escapement S * β :
The target S * β will be chosen optimally according to the usual marginal rule that
We shall assume that S 
defines a steady-state pattern, with
and the cycle
repeating endlessly.
COMPETITIVE HARVEST
Next we return to consideration of a harvesting confrontation, between a distantwater α-fleet (DWF) and the combined β-fleet of the RFMO countries. As described above, the β-fleet can harvest in its combined territorial waters (its EEZs) but also on the high seas. The distant water α-fleet's harvest is confined to the high-seas region.
For simplicity we assume that, in a season when both fleets undertake a high seas harvest, the β-fleet's high seas harvest will precede the harvest by the distant-water α-fleet. Other assumptions would yield similar results. If the β-fleet does enter, it will harvest a biomass h θβ ≥ 0, reducing the high seas recruitment R θ to an escapement
A subsequent α-fleet harvest h α ≥ 0 drops the high seas escapement still further, to
The cyclic generational pattern is thus elaborated to
Unlike the home-based β-fleet, the distant-water α-fleet can be expected to experience a significant fixed cost of entry, both in transportation costs in moving the fleet and in opportunity costs of passing over alternative harvesting opportunities. Accordingly we assume that the α-fleet's policy is to enter the high seas fishery only if S θβ exceeds a critical threshold level R α , which may lie well above its target escapement level (compare McKelvey et al., 2002) .
In this study we undertake to determine the optimal harvest policy for the RFMO β-fleet, given that it is undertaking total α-fleet exclusion. We assume that indeed the β-fleet has the effort capacity necessary to exclude α-fleet entry completely, thus
though such exclusion may come only at high cost. The rationale for, and implications of, this assumption will be explored in the concluding section of the article.
The optimal β-fleet policy for achieving α-exclusion in any particular season depends, first of all, on the initial recruitment R at the beginning of that season. Because of our continuing assumption, of lower β-fleet harvesting costs in home waters than on high seas, therefore optimally, S θβ ≤ R α should be achieved with minimal high-seas β-fleet harvest. Thus, in any harvest season with initial recruitment R, the high seas β-fleet escapement must be
That is, β-fleet high seas harvest occurs only when necessary to bring the high seas stock down to the α-fleet's entry threshold. Otherwise β-fleet harvesting is confined to its home waters. Equivalently, in any harvest season S θ is determined by the size of recruitment R relative to a critical recruitment level
Specifically,
Feasible Escapements and Feasible Steady-States
While S θ is completely determined in this way, the corresponding home-waters escapement level S β is only constrained, by the obvious feasibility constraint that home waters escapement cannot exceed home waters final recruitment R β . Thus, for given recruitment R,
More explicitly,
In particular, in order for a given escapement b S β ≤ K to generate a feasible steady-
the above feasibility constraint becomes that
Note that, if b R ≤ R crit , the steady-state feasibility requirement says only that
, and this follows automatically from the assumption ( b
In the opposite case where
the steady-state feasibility constraint
may be written as
In figure 1 , the convex graph of b Hence there is a unique feasible steady-state recruitment level b
This is precisely the recruitment level e R > R crit where the steady-state feasibility constraint binds. Consequently this particular recruitment generates the feasible steady-state configuration
which entails only a high seas harvest.
As figure 1 illustrates, each recruitment level b R on the interval
meets the steady-state feasibility requirement, with the high-seas harvest pinching
3.2 Optimal defensive management by the β-fleet.
We turn now to an examination of which, among the feasible steady-states, will in fact be optimal as a target, for maximizing the β-fleet's discounted-sum payoff while deterring the entry of the α-fleet. The answer will depend on the particular values of the parameter pair (R α , θ)
We shall focus on the situation of a RFMO's β-fleet which, up to the present time, had been harvesting optimally at steady-state S * β without external challenge. But, we assume, from this time onward it is faced with a constant threat of entry by a distantwater α-fleet, with entry threshold R α . Thus to exclude α-fleet entry the β-fleet must initially harvest-down the high seas recruitment θR to R α , then follow up by an optimal sequence of subsequent home waters and high seas harvests, always keeping S βθ ≤ R α . The way in which this is accomplished depends on the relative size of the entry-threshold level R α of the α-fleet, as compared to the high-seas recruitment θR * which prevails when the β-fleet harvests optimally as an unchallenged sole-operator.
The resolution is particularly easy when the challenging fleet has an especially high entry threshold: i.e. when R α ≥ θR * . Recalling that, by assumption, R * < K, this implies that S * β ≤ R * ≤ R crit . In this case the incumbent fleet need only modify its sole-operator optimal policy mildly, by setting
in order to deter α-fleet entry. Note that, for initial R ≥ S * β , one has
Hence set
Thus this modified sole-operator policy continues to lead to yield a trajectory of most-rapid-approach to the optimal sole-operator steady-state, while simultaneously deterring α-fleet entry.
Thus, in what follows, we can concentrate on the situation where
with entry threshold low relative to the unchallenged home fleet's steady-state recruitment.
Determining Admissible Steady-States
In general the β-fleet's optimal competitive harvest escapement S β , given the entry threshold R α of the α-fleet and the current recruitment R, is determined by solving a dynamic programming equation. Let V [R] denote the optimal (discounted sum)
payoff to the β-fleet Assuming a positive harvest in the initial year, so that R > S β .the dynamic programming equation (DPE) is
Note that the permissible range of S β is determined by the feasibility constraint, that home-waters escapement S β cannot exceed terminal home-waters recruitment R β . In particular, if R ≤ K, then the corresponding steady-state escapement
lies within the feasible range.
Our goal is to determine the feasible escapement
which maximizes V [R] for large R. In this section we narrow down the candidate set of escapements to those which provide local extrema of V [R] , within the permissible range of feasibility. To find an interior extremum, one differentiates the bracketed expression in the DPE by S β . Each locally-optimal escapement necessarily must satisfy
with the inequality possible only when the feasibility constraint binds. Here
where
In particular when the feasibility constraint
does not bind, which is so if R is sufficiently large, then S β generates a feasible steady-state which satisfies
independent of large R.
As discussed previously, the global solution to the equation
However the equation Thus it remains to determine the global optimum when R α < θR * (i.e. when R crit < R * ).
Determining the optimal admissable steady-state.
The discounted-sum payoff, starting from a sufficiently large fixed initial recruitment R and resolving directly into a pattern of steady-state harvests on both high seas and home waters, is
This pattern is feasible for any S β such that S crit < S β < e S β , and in particular
However the formal expression which defines the payoff is meaningful as a mathematical expression for any S β ≤ K, even though, outside of the region of feasibility, the corresponding triple [F (S β ), R α , S β ] will no longer represent an attainable harvesting pattern.
Differentiating W by S β , one finds
independent of R. 
This result can aid in determining which of the zeroes of the multi-valued function S # β are maxima and which are minima. Thus if, for a given [R α , θ], this function has only simple zeroes, then W (S β ) has a local maximum at the upper branch of S # β and alternating local minimum and maxima at subsequent branch.
SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS: AN ILLUSTRATION
Our analysis has revealed that, whenever the incumbent β-fleet is able to exclude entry of the potential invader α-fleet, the optimal β-policy is most-rapid approach to a stable steady-state which is determined by the parameter pair (R α , θ) as follows:
and
is optimal, and leads to the stable steady state {S * θ , S * β , R * }, with R * = F (S * β ) and S * θ = θR * . By assumption, R * < K, so that this policy is always optimal when R crit ≥ K, i.e. when the α-fleet entry threshold is high relative to the high-seas migratory fraction of the stock.
B) Hereafter consider that, for given (R α , θ),
The globally-optimal steady state will be determined by a steady-state recruitment b R on the interval
and will occur at one of the local optima of R # lying within this closed interval or at one of the endpoints, should it be a (constrained) local maximum. The outcome is unambiguous when there is only one local maximum in the interval. If there are more, then the outcome may depend on the value of the initial recruitment R(0) at
There are a number of possibilities, depending on the multiplicity of the multiplevalued function R # (R α , θ). We illustrate by considering the cases that arise in fig. 2 and, and in the panels shown in figure 3 . Figure 2 shows the value function, W , against R, and the possibilities that arise below the graph. Figure 3 shows S * , S # , S crit and e S against R α for a given θ.
A typical situation is that shown in figure 3 (lower right), where the curve defining
, regarded as a function of R α for fixed θ, has no solution for small R α , is double valued for sufficiently large R α ,and single valued at the boundary between these two intervals of R α . Furthermore, these formal solution values need not lie within the interval of feasibility R crit ≤ R # ≤ e R, see figure 2 also. Where there are two, and both are feasible, it turns out that the higher one R # is a maximum and the lower R # a minimum, as shown by the following argument.
B 1 ) Consider that, for given (R α , θ), the multi-valued function R # (R α , θ) is empty so that W 0 ( b S) is never zero, and hence remains negative for all b S ∈ [S crit , e S]. Thus the maximum of W ( b S) on that interval occurs at
and the optimal policy is most-rapid approach to the stable steady state
Thus for any seasonal recruitment R,
This can be seen in all four panels of figure 3 .
and that.W 0 ( b S) has simple zeroes at S # and S # . Then, since W 0 (K) < 0, it follows that W ( b S) has a global maximum at S # and a global minimum at S # . Again there are several possibilities. In fact, there are six possibilities altogether as can be recognized from figure 2.
Case I : If
then R = R # is a local maximum and both R = R crit and R = e R are local minima of W on the closed interval [R crit , e R] Hence the two-region harvest policy determined
Case II Suppose
then, throughout the interval [R crit , e R], one has W 0 ( e S) < 0. Hence, as in case B 1 , the policy determined by b R = R crit is optimal. Thus there is only a home-waters harvest at steady state.
On the other hand, if .
is optimal. Thus there is only a high seas harvest at steady state.
Finally
Case III Here the optimal policy is ambiguous, and may depend not only on (R α , θ) but also on the initial recruitment R(0).
In the first subcase, where
, and hence each remains a candidate for optimal steady-state recruitment. (However at the parameter value (R α , θ) where the two
In the second subcase, where
CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis is highly idealized, but perhaps suggestive. It shows that, in principle, an aggressive harvesting policy by an incumbent fleet could deter entry by a distant-water fleet, by deliberately drawing down the high-seas stock. It also shows that, depending on the relative strategic strengths of the fleets, this might sometimes 22 be achieved by relatively modest deviations from unchallenged monopolistic policies.
The analysis could be elaborated to incorporate greater realism. (For example, a more realistic model formulation would make R α stochastic, and only partially predictable by the β-fleet. In that circumstance, the task before the β-fleet would become to develop a harvest policy which would achieve a balance between ongoing costs of deterrence and the occasional severe disruption of the fishery by interloper fleets.)
However the analysis does demonstrate that the strategies explored here are rather desperate: The economic and ecological losses they entail might be acceptable on a few occasions (to prevent a catastrophic stock draw-down by a one-time potential invader), but an on-going policy of preemptory high-seas stock draw-down could be a very expensive form of insurance against an ongoing threat. Furthermore, it carries its own risks, since fishery stock-assessment is an uncertain science, and mis-calculations (especially leading to over-harvesting) could be quite damaging.
The strategic position of an incumbent β-fleet attempting such a policy could be very weak. Indeed, if the DWF's threshold entry level is below the β-fleet's highseas break-even level, then exclusion is possible only by harvesting at a loss. Even when high-seas harvesting is profitable, it will be less so than continuing to harvest exclusively at home. And even if exclusion is possible without a high-seas β-harvest, the home-waters target escapements necessary to achieve exclusion will be below the level that would be most profitable for an unchallenged monopolist. As we have seen, for such low levels of the DWF's entry barrier, the home-fleet's policy may be discontinuous, implying sudden drops in the escapement. The picture is somewhat brighter when the distant-water fleet's entrance threshold is high, and/or the fraction of recruitment that is accessible to the invading α-fleet is small. In conclusion, static and dynamic analysis both predict that barriers to entry into a regionally managed straddling-stock fishery can indeed be constructed within the harvesting sector, but that the erection of such barriers can often have substantial negative consequences, both for biological sustainability and economic efficiency. An established Regional Management Organization does possess certain strategic advantages which it can exploit in order to internalize competition. These include the first-mover advantage of incumbency and exclusive harvesting rights within the home-countries' EEZs. But normally these advantages can be invoked only at high cost.
The analysis thus lends support to the thesis that the leverage needed to enforce regional management control must be sought elsewhere, other than through the direct application of economic power within the harvesting sector alone. The horizontal line is . Note that is a multivalued function. Typically no value for small and two for high . The upper branch of represents a local maximum and the lower a local minimum. Only the part of between (exclusive high sea harvesting) and represents admissible solutions for the mixed harvesting. The optimal solutions are given by the thick curve. The panel is produced by the standard model given by , and . The discounting factor and the panels are produced with from upper left to lower right. Scale is relative to the Carrying Capasity (K). 
